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Due to the plethora of international elements of a contract to arbitrate, i.e. nationalities 
of the parties, nature of the transaction and the legal background of the arbitrator, questions of 
law applicable to the substance of the dispute are always at stake. In the course of arbitral 
proceedings,  issues  of  law  applicable  to  the  arbitral  dispute  are  raised  after  a  concise 
examination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, namely whether the parties 
have consented to arbitrate the subject-matter in issue and the law applicable to the arbitral 
procedure. The present study draws upon the principle of party autonomy, in both theoretical 
and practical aspects in the context of the freedom of contract principle. It further considers 
the restrictive role of mandatory rules upon the above principle. Light shall also be shed on 
the current  trends of international  mandatory rules and public policy as discussed in ICC 
awards  by  experienced  arbitrators  and  solely  developed  within  the  ambit  of  international 
commercial arbitration. Furthermore, a consistent examination of possible choices of law and 
rules of law such as a-national rules i.e. lex mercatoria and general trade usages will sketch 
the existing variety of possibilities in choice of law both on the parties and lawyers leading 
arbitrations. The last Section will independently examine an absence of choice of law, and 
several  doctrines  which  envisaged the  stance  of  the  three  distinguished European arbitral 
systems: English, Swiss and French. 
 
 
Introduction
 In  recent  years  expert  English  practitioners  have  stressed  the  rigidity  and 
malfunctioning of previous English arbitral legislation and a new Arbitration Act came into 
force in 1996 to clarify vital issues in the topic. However, seven years later the above Act still 
reserves the arbitrator's liberty to directly choose himself an applicable law, without going 
through a conflict method or giving him any guidelines, as Swiss law does, to choose the 
applicable  law.  This  does  pose  impediments  on  the  evolution  of  English  arbitration. 
Switzerland on the other hand being traditionally neutral and distant from any influences of 
common European trends, has developed a constructive arbitral system. French law has been 
more liberal by bringing into force a new Arbitration Act in the early 1980’s. 
The lack of developed countries to reach a consensus on issues of law applicable to the 
merits of the arbitral dispute and choice of law methods renders the drafting of a common text 
difficult. Nevertheless private international law makers were convinced of the need to revamp 
national and institutional arbitration rules for the sake of international commerce. Historically, 
disparities among national legal systems have established trade competition and thus achieved 
its  evolution.  In any case,  the parties are free to set  their own rules by choosing a given 
national system which best serves their interests and expectations. 
Nonetheless, the following analysis considers consistent methods used by arbitrators 
in the course of delivering an award. Irrespective of an express, implied or absence of choice 
of law by the parties, the arbitrator in practice has pioneered more flexible and convenient 
techniques, suited to commercial expectations. These in turn should ensure the lack of any 
objections at the possible place of enforcement.
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Section I: Party autonomy in arbitral systems
1.1 Party autonomy in arbitral systems- General Observations
The principle of party autonomy emanates from the freedom of contract doctrine in 
international  commercial  law.  Professor  Bonell  has put  forward an appropriate  definition: 
“The right of business people to decide freely to whom they will offer their goods or services 
and by whom they wish to be supplied, as well as the possibility for them freely to agree on 
the terms of individual transactions, are the cornerstones of an open, market-oriented and 
competitive international economic order”.1 In the context of private international law, this 
entails the recognition of the parties’ right in a domestic or international contract to select the 
law which shall govern their transaction. Generally, the “mission of private international law” 
is to determine the scope of party autonomy and the formal requirements connected with its 
exercise, even in cases where the parties have made an express choice of law  either though an 
arbitration clause or a choice of law clause within the contract.2 
Berti  has  illustrated  the  free  choice  of  law  by  the  parties  as  “the  most  essential 
cornerstone in international law, recognised in practically all national legal systems”.3 Rigid 
objections to the party autonomy concept were motivated on the basis that by choosing a law 
to govern their rights the parties are awarded excessive powers of a legislative body who 
choose a law threatening the State’s sovereignty (the  territorialist attitude). However, as a 
matter  of  principle,  contractual  stipulations  should  not  extend  to  violate  the  authority  of 
territorial sovereign and national public policy considerations. In the past many countries such 
as  the ex  socialist  countries  of  Eastern Europe or  China  exercised strict  control  over  the 
choice of law in international contracts concerning mostly a private and a state party.  But 
1Michael  Joachim  Bonell:  “The  UNIDROIT  Principles  Of  International  Commercial  Contracts”, 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/pr-exper.htm, at page 7.
2 Guiditta Cordero Moss- Tano Aschehoug: “International Commercial Arbitration”, Rome 1999, at page 246.
3 Stephen V. Berti: “International Arbitration in Switzerland”, Kluwer Law International, London 2000, at page 
198.
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nowadays the position has changed by allowing a “delegation of sovereign powers to private 
individuals”.4  
The freedom of choice principle was celebrated in the rulings of the Athens session of 
1979 of the Institute of International Law.5 The same Institute declared the full autonomy of 
the parties to choose substantive rules in its Santiago de Compostela session in 1989 and its 
Basle resolution in 1992 respectively.6 Much earlier though, the Geneva Convention of 1961 
had pronounced the principle of party autonomy in  Article  VII  para 1.  Nevertheless,  this 
provision is of limited effect, since the parties have to choose “one law”, namely a state law. 
The concept of “law” in the UNCITRAL Rules is reflected in Article 33(1) and interpreted as 
making a choice of law  in force even as amended. This involves the question of  time of 
choice which should not be an impediment to the arbitral dispute. “Law” may also comprise a 
Convention which has not yet been ratified and in that case shall be treated as lex mercatoria 
with similar reservations7. Furthermore, the parties are free to vary the law applicable to the 
dispute normally by a subsequent agreement8. On the other hand, to ensure predictability of a 
choice  of  “law” it  is  generally  accepted  that,  unless  otherwise  specifically  agreed by the 
parties, a choice of law clause referring to a particular law does not comprise its conflict of 
laws rules including renvoi.9
In regard to party autonomy, the innovation of arbitration, unlike ordinary litigation 
before national courts, lies primarily in the freedom of the parties to choose not a single law 
but also a-national rules and other conflict methods, enabling a choice of law appropriate for 
the case at hand. Departing from this concept, modern arbitral laws  empower both the parties 
4 Ibid.
5 It was declared in a resolution Article 2.  
6 Article 6 and  Article 2.1.
7 Matti Pellonpää-David D.Caron:“The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules As Interpreted And Applied”, at page 88.
8 Redfern/ Hunter:“Law and Practice in International Commercial Arbitration”, London 1999, para 2-24: This is 
so inferred by the Rome Convention Article 3.
9Unlike the Rome Convention and other private international law texts, to this effect has purported Section 46 
(2) of the EAA of 1996.
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and the arbitrator to choose “rules of law” which may not have a state origin.10 They can be an 
autonomous system or part of a specific national law. 
In the first place, the English legislator in the EAA of 1996 Section 46(1) preferred the 
more ambiguous and flexible wording of “other considerations” to the expression “rules of 
law” in order to close the door to a-national rules. Having allowed the parties in sub-section a 
to choose “a law” it is nowadays accepted that sub-section b allows them to choose “rules” of 
law, amiable composition or equity. In Switzerland the freedom of choice of law is enunciated 
in Article 187 of the LDIP. Para 2 of this article allows the parties to choose “rules of law” by 
authorising the arbitrator to decide on equity. This is a restrictive provision not influenced by 
other criteria of private international law.11
Party  autonomy  is  broad  enough  to  allow a  choice  of  neutral  law.  Whatever  the 
motivations of the parties, the choice of a neutral law is valid under all arbitral systems. Lord 
Wright in the Vita Food case had ruled that: “Familiar principles of English commercial law 
have gained a worldwide importance which make it  reasonable for parties  to  commercial 
contracts to subject their transactions to English law, although there has nothing to do with the 
facts of the particular case”.12 Nevertheless,  the freedom of choice allowing the parties to 
choose a neutral law was treated differently in the past. Private international law subjected the 
validity  of  the  choice  of  law made  by  the  parties  to  an  “objective”  connection  with  the 
economy of the contract. For the purposes of modernising private international law theory and 
practice this theory has been abandoned.  This is  also reflected by the combined effect  of 
Article 1(1)  and 3(1) of the Rome Convention13: the parties may choose the law of another 
country, even a non member one, and the Courts of contracting states must, subject to the 
mandatory rules of Article 3(3), give effect to this choice.14 While the Rome Convention does 
10 Article 22.3 of the LCIA Arb. Rules, Article 17.1 of the ICC Arb. Rules, Article 1496 of the French NCPC.
11 Andreas Bucher: “Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse ”, Bâle 1988, at page 83.
12 Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] AC 277, at page 290.
13 The EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1980) was entered into force in 
England  by  the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
14 Dicey and Morris on “ The Conflict of Laws ”, Volume 2, London 2000, at pages 1216-1217
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not apply to arbitration agreements by virtue of Section 1. para 2(d), an English arbitrator is 
provided with consistent solutions offered by the above convention in choice of law issues. 
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1.2  Ascertaining  the  applicable  law-  English  Background:  From the  development  of 
“Proper Law” to the Rome Convention. 
1.2.1 Proper Law - Express choice of law:The doctrine of proper law of the contract which 
is attached to the principle of party autonomy has mainly evolved in England and countries 
which follow similar legal systems while continental European legal systems have followed 
the concept of applicable-governing law.15 Professor Lalive, sitting in an ICC arbitration has 
affirmed that: “There are few principles more universally admitted in private international law 
than that referred to by the standard terms of the “proper law of the contract”.16
In English legal tradition the solutions offered by the lex loci contractus (law of the 
place where the contract was made) and the lex loci solutions (the law of the place where the 
contract  was to be performed) fell  short  of meeting new standards in the field of private 
international law.17  Departing from this position, every international contract has its proper 
law which has been expressly or impliedly chosen by the parties to govern their contractual 
relations. Even in the absence of choice, the court has to impute an intention or determine the 
proper law which the parties would have intended to govern their dispute.18 English scholars, 
relying  on  previous  case  law,  have  given  a  simple  interpretation  to  the  term:  “the  law 
governing  many  of  the  matters  affecting  the  contract.19 Lord  Diplock  in  Compagnie  
Tunisienne stated that: “Proper law means the system of law which governs the interpretation 
and  the  validity  of  the  contract  and  the  mode  of  performance  and  the  consequences  of 
15The concept of proper law was more restrictively construed than the term “applicable law”, in a sense that it is 
confined to a legal system per se and does not freely accomodate something less than a legal system i.e. legal 
rules or rules other than a legal system.
16 ICC 1512/1971, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 3-5.
17http://users.ox.ac.uk/~alls0104/IDS13_arbitralprocess3.htm  .  The  lex  loci  contractus  was  criticised  on 
validating an otherwise invalid contract and the lex loci solutionis on the difficulties in ascertaining the law in a 
“bilateral” contract, namely a contract where each party has to perform its obligations to a different country.
18 Mount Albert Borough Council v Australasian Temperance and General Assurance Society [1938] AC 224, 
at  page  240. The expression “proper  law of  the contract  includes the legal  order governing the transaction 
according to the willing of the parties or, when the intention of the parties in this respect are non existent or 
cannot be derived from the surrounding circumstances to the legal order showing the closest  and most  real 
connection with the transaction”.  
19 Chesire and North: “ Private International Law ”, Butterworths (1999), at page 534.
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breaches  of  the  contract”.20 Furthermore,  Lord  Willberforce  in  the  Amin  Rasheed21 case 
defined it as “the law which governs the contract and the parties obligations under it”. 
It has been observed that the autonomy principle affords the parties the right to a free 
choice of law. In the past decades, scholars were divided as to the extent of these powers.22 
The above principle is examined in conjunction with the common intentions of the parties 
when inserting the arbitration clause into a contract.23 In England, until the passing of the 
Rome Convention, lawyers and judges had followed two views.24 Relying on the Vita Food25 
case, the fundamental rule of conflict of laws is that the intention of the parties is the “general 
test” of what law is to apply and consequently an express choice of law is “conclusive”. Lord 
Wright asserted that: “ The express statement by the parties of their intention to select English 
law as the law of the contract should be conclusive provided that the intention expressed is 
bona fide and legal, and provided that there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground 
of  public  policy ”. The second view treats  an express  choice  of  law as  merely  being an 
element pointing to the proper law or “ only  prima facie  evidence ”, or only “ one of the 
factors to be taken into account ” or “ one but by no means the only ”, matter to be taken into 
consideration.26 
In the context of arbitration, it is common ground that the arbitrator does not have the 
power to substitute the parties’ choice with his own when there is an express choice of law, 
20Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA  [1971] AC 572, at page 
603.Lord Diplock stipulated that: “The first stage to trace proper law is to determine whether the parties have 
intended by their contract to exercise any choice of law at all and if they did to determine what was the system of 
law which they selected, by applying ordinary rules of English law relating to the construction of the contracts. 
In the case where the Court finds that no such choice has been made, the second stage shall be to determine itself 
what the proper law is by using the “closest and most real connection test ”. The same principle was spelt out by 
Lord Morris who asserted that:“The general rule is that the proper law of a contract is that law by which the 
parties intended that their rights should be determined”.
21 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] AC 50, at page 69. 
22 A.F.M. Maniruzzaman:“  Choice of Law in International Contracts-Some Conflict of Laws Issues  ”, J.I.A. 
Vol.16 (1999), at page 164.
23 ICC 6379/1990, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 134-142.
24 Dicey and Morris on “ The Conflict of Laws ”, Volume 2, London 2000, at pages 1216-1217.
25 Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping Co, [1939] AC 277, at page 290. Lord Diplock has stated as follows: “ 
The proper law of the contract was English law since the provisions of the policy taken as a whole by necessary 
implication  led  to  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  it  was  the  parties’  intention  that  their  mutual  rights  and 
obligations under it should be determined in accordance with the English law of Marine Insurance ”.
26 Op.cit., supra n. 24.
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which is clear and unambiguous, and when no valid reason has been invoked to deny him the 
right to  give effect  to  such a choice.  However  surprising a choice of law may seem, the 
arbitrator must respect it.  This is  in accordance with  Article 3(1) which provides that  the 
choice must be expressed or demonstrated with “reasonable certainty” by the terms of the 
contract or the circumstances of the case otherwise regard shall be given to Article 4 of the 
above Convention.27 Blessing28 draws an effective distinction between certain limitations that 
should apply to the parties’ choice namely a) a choice in fraudem legis will not be recognised: 
“A party who, on purpose makes a choice of law so as to circumvent the applicability of an 
undesired law,  will  not  deserve protection” and b) even where the parties  have chosen a 
“particular  national  law”  there  will  be  foreign  laws  that  tend  to  claim  extra-territorial 
application. 
In the final analysis, the arbitrator is called to honour the legitimate expectations of the 
parties in the formation of an international contract. Arbitral theory and practice point to the 
effect of the binding force of the proper law which, as a principle of conflicts of laws, lies in 
the parties’ autonomy. In this sense, even the place where the award is made is bound to give 
effect to the agreement of the parties. 
1.2.2 Dépeçage: 
This is the French term for what is known as “split proper law” method. The Institute of 
International Law has set out adequate definitions of the terms in Basle resolution in 1991.29 
International Conventions such as the ICSID Convention of 196530 favour the “operational 
relationship between the applicable Contracting State law and such rules of international law 
27J.H.C. Morris “The Conflict of Law ”, London 2000, at page 329. It is also possible that although an express 
choice of law is omitted, the terms of the contract i.e. standard forms or practices of a particular market may be 
properly interpreted as pointing clearly to the parties’  assumption that  the law of  a  particular  country shall 
governed. 
28  Op.cit.,supra n. 3.
29 Article 7.
30 Article 42(1).
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as may be applicable”. Professor  Fouchard  31 invoking the  Aramco  case asserts that since 
from the  wording  of  Article  1496 of  the  French NCPC “rules  of  law”  are  allowed,  this 
provision validates dépecage without it being necessary to justify and isolate every part of the 
contract. This view is also complemented by the Rome Convention in  Article 3 (1) which, 
although it refers to the whole or part of the contract, allows the parties to select two or more 
laws to govern different parts of the contract. It is observed that this method gives the parties 
a wide range of choice and even opponents of the use of a-national law have conceded that 
through  dépeçage parties  can  free  themselves  from  national restrictions.32 Generally, 
dépeçage represents the frontier of party autonomy, signifying the legal pluralism within the 
context of the same contract.33 Private international law experts have stressed34 that in the 
case where the parties have chosen different laws for different parts of the contract this choice 
must be logically consistent.35
However  welcome the application of  dépeçage may be,  it  should be applied with 
caution.  Arbitrators  often  exercise  certain  discretion  in  complex  commercial  contracts  to 
determine the relationship of different laws in an arbitration clause. In the  Liamco case the 
sole arbitrator has addressed the issue on an appropriate basis. He applied one system of law 
as the “principal proper law” and treated the others as subsidiary.36 By doing so, he sought to 
preserve the “unity” of the proper law by subordinating the “split” laws as incorporation to the 
principal proper law.  
31 Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman “ Traitė de l‘ arbitrage commercial international ”, Paris 1996, at page 806.
32 Peter Nygh “Autonomy in International Contracts” (1999), at page 176.
33 Dicey and Morris “The Conflict of Laws” 10th ed. (1980), at page 749.
34 Op.cit.,supra n.  19,  at  page 553. Two situations are  distinguished:  a) when the different laws cannot be 
reconciled, both choices fail  and the criterion to determine the applicable law is the conflict  of rules in the 
absence of choice and b) when for the remainder of the contract no choice of law has been made it will again be 
treated as an absence of choice.
35 Peter Nygh:“Autonomy in International Contracts”, Oxford 1999,at page 133. The author insists that if no 
express choice has been made as to the remainder of the contract, the  objective default test  clearly becomes 
applicable to the whole of the contract.
36 LIAMCO v. Libya, 62 ILR 140, 1980.
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1.2.3 Implied choice in the context of Private International Law. 
Having abandoned the old fashioned doctrine of “presumed intention of the parties”, the new 
test at common law is to ascertain whether the parties have made an implied choice of law 
through a clear  indication of the intention drawn from the terms of the contract  and the 
surrounding  circumstances.  This  is  known  as  the  “inferred  intention  test”.37 Morris  has 
sketched the intention criteria specifically referring to the ‘language’38 of the contract and the 
‘surrounding circumstances’39 at the time of making it.  By citing a case,  he identified the 
concept of common law in the true intention of the parties in accordance with sound ideas of 
business and reasons of convenience.40 For many years English law has treated the parties’ 
choice of the place of arbitration as a “conclusive presumption”. This presumption in turn 
pointed to the respective  lex fori as the law applicable to their dispute as illustrated by the 
learned judge in the Tzortzis case.41 This theory is now disputed and does not constitute good 
law. It was further argued in the case of Compagnie Tunisienne by Lord Wilberforce that “an 
arbitration clause is an indication to be considered together with the rest of the contract and 
the relevant surrounding facts”.42 In arbitral practice a choice of an arbitral forum is rarely 
37 Op.cit., supra n.35 ,at page 105.
38 In  an ICC award 6560/ 1991, C.  of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at  pages 148-151, the arbitrator  connected the 
terminology to the language used in a contract and stated as follows:“In the context of international arbitration 
under an international contract there is no need to place any substantial reliance on the fact that the Englsih 
language was used. It is nowdays the lingua franca of all trade and in my own experience is frequently used 
between nationals of the same non English speaking country”.
39 Dicey and Morris on “The Conflict of Laws”, Volume 2,  London 2000, at page 1215. The authors invoke  two 
respective cases. 1. Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v Kuwait Insurance Co.[1984] AC 50 and 2. Whitworth Street  
Estates (Manchester) Ltd. V James Miller and Partners Ltd [1985] AC 583. The latter case concerned an implied 
choice of law as a result of the use of a RIBA standard form. The question was one of construction of the 
contract. In construing the contract it was permissible to take into account the surrounding circumstances at the 
conclusion of the contract.
40 J.H.C. Morris: “The Conflict of Laws”, London 2000, at page 323. Jacobs v Crėdit Lyonnais [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 
589.
41 Tzortzis and Sykias v Monark Line A/B  [1968]1 W.L.R. 406. Lord Denning had stated as follows at page 411: 
“The circumstance that parties agree that any differences are to be settled by arbitration in a certain country will 
lead to an inference that they intend the law of that country to apply”. Lord Justice Salmon stated at page 413: 
“Although the contract was most closely connected to Swedish law, the presumption in favour of English law 
arising from the arbitration clause was “irresistible”. The principle was qui elegit judicem elegit jus. An express 
choice of Tribunal was treated as an implied choice of English as the proper law.
42 Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v Compagnie d‘Armement Maritime SA [1971] AC 572, at page 596. 
In this case there was an arbitration clause for arbitration to be held in London. However, French law applied as 
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equated with a choice of law. It is believed that an implied choice of law should be restricted 
to instances where the parties’ contractual provisions  clearly and  unequivocally manifest a 
preference for a particular law, i.e. a standard Lloyd’s policy of marine insurance, as was the 
reasoning in Whitworth Street Estates.43 
The Rome Convention of 1980 sought to highlight the issue of an implied choice of 
law. Article 3(1) reads that an implied choice is one “demonstrated with reasonable certainty” 
by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. The Court may hold that, in the 
light of all the facts, the parties made a real choice of law although this is not expressly stated 
in the contract.44 Furthermore the Guiliano-Lagarde Report states that “in no case shall the 
Court infer a choice of law that the parties might have made where they had no clear intention 
of making such a choice”. This report sets forth a number of examples.45 
1.2.4 Special case-Observation of implied choice of law in institutional arbitration:
An implied choice of law may be established by the choice of the parties to submit to 
institutional arbitration. This conduct is also known as an indirect choice of law. Moreover, an 
institutional arbitration rule may explicitly mention further recourse for the designation of the 
applicable  law.  To  the  extent  that  the  respective  arbitration  law  contains  imperative 
provisions, the above designation will be considerably restricted.46 Notably, some institutional 
rules as  Article 4 (2) of the ZCC arbitration rules allow the arbitrator to resort to national 
private international law provisions, namely the Swiss LDIP. But some authors have criticised 
the proper law of the contract.  
43 Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd v James Miller & Partners Ltd [1970] A.C. 583
44 Op.cit.,supra no 24, at page 1227. 
45Ibid.A)a standard form of contract as in  Amin Rasheed,B) a previous course of dealing between the parties 
under contracts containing an express choice of law or “an express choice of law in related transactions between 
the same parties”. C) a choice of law may be reasonably inferred from the choice of the Courts of a particular 
country to determine a dispute: “qui elegit iudicem elegit ius”. This approach was also encompassed in  Egon 
Oldendorff v Libera Corporation(No 2)[1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 380.
46 Article 17 of the ICC Rules provides that the parties’ autonomy may be restricted but not limited to one law as 
in Article VII para 1 of the Geneva Convention of 1961. 
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this provision which is a réglement dispositif , in the sense that it may constitute an “indirect 
derogation” of otherwise applicable arbitration rules.47 Such modifications may validate an 
initially null clause with regard to the applicable law. Accordingly,  the parties’ conduct in 
submitting different parts of their contract for resolution by several arbitral institutions may 
infer an attempt for forum shopping. 
Finally the theory of implied choice of law has been criticised for uncertainty and 
unpredictability because it is difficult to ascertain one’s intention at a given time. However, 
the application of certain presumptions may still provide sufficient clarity.
47 Jean-François Poudret- Sébastien Besson :  “Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international”, Bruxelles 2002, 
page 612.  With the exception of contrary indication these material dispositions (dispositions matėrielles) of a 
national  law and not its  conflict  rules  do not allow for the application of  renvoi.  This does not  imply that 
dépeçage is excluded.
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Section II:  Mandatory Rules
2.1 Two theories:
 To the extent that party autonomy is still perceived within the realm of national or 
international  interest,  it  shall  be limited  by considerations  of  mandatory  rules  and public 
policy of the forum or a third country. In the context of arbitration practice, two relevant 
approaches have been developed: 
1.  Traditional-Legalistic  approach:  The  concept  is  that  the  arbitrator  has  to  take 
mandatory rules into account. This is mirrored in  Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention and 
Article 19 of the  LDIP.48 The arbitrator,  although he is  not a national judge, may invoke 
mandatory rules and should not be passive to the parties’ conducts. Deviating from this task, 
arbitration would be a means of fraude à la loi.49 
 2. Delocalisation: Given that arbitration agreements are usually entered into between 
parties of relatively equal bargaining power, the operation of mandatory rules in this area may 
be  limited  in  practice.  A  narrow  interpretation  of  such  statutory  rules  would  enhance 
possibilities of enforcement and not undermine the international arbitral process.50 Modern 
arbitral practice is orientated to the exclusion of overriding mandatory rules in favour of the 
parties’ autonomy, which should not be limited by such exclusions.51
2.2 Categories of mandatory rules:
2.2.1 Legal order of a third Country: 
Lois  de  police, as  the  French  term  is  used  preferentially  in  international  commercial 
arbitration.  An arbitrator  is  called  to  take  into  account  the  rules  forming  part  of  another 
48 However in international arbitration Article 187 applies as lex specialis.
49 Jean-Baptiste Racine:“ L’Arbitrage Commercial International et l‘ Ordre Public ”, Bibl. de Dr. Pr. Tome 309, 
1997, at page 238.
50 Richard Garnett: “A practical guide to international commercial arbitration”, Oceana Publications, U.S. 2000, 
at page 24.
51 ICC 1512/ 1971, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 3-5.
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judicial system from that chosen by the parties to govern the dispute. At the same time he 
shall not deviate form his task in making a strict application of the law chosen by the parties. 
The rationale of their application dovetails with their aim to serve public policy independently 
of any rule of conflict. A close connection between the subject-matter of the parties’ contract 
and  the  jurisdiction  area  or  State  that  has  promulgated  the  mandatory  rule  must  be 
established.5253 Growing significance  has been  attached by some scholars  to a  functional 
approach which has developed to prevent any choice of law which in turn would avoid their 
application.  In  that  sense,  the mandatory  rules  are  imposed irrespective  of  the applicable 
law.54 The latter approach necessitates the application of private and public law rules aiming 
to protect the weaker party for example a consumer, an employee or vital public interests such 
as tax law.55
The latter approach is also encompassed by the Rome Convention which poses two 
requirements in Article 7: The rule in question must not only be incapable of being derogated 
from by the contract as Article 3(3) requires but it must also be regarded by the State enacting 
the rule as applicable whatever law applies to the contract as a whole.56 Until the early 1980’s 
mandatory  rules  of  a  third  country  was  an  unfamiliar  concept  to  English  lawyers.  Upon 
ratifying the Rome Convention of 1980 the United Kingdom relied on Article 22 and did not 
permit  the  application  of  Article  7  (1) which  gives  effect  of  foreign  lois  de  police  or 
international mandatory rules to the forum.57 Exceptionally the English Court of Appeal has 
allowed consideration of foreign mandatory rules in  Ralli Bros.58 On the other side of the 
52 Stephen V. Berti: “International Arbitration in Switzerland”, Kluwer Law International, London 2000, at page 
251.  The author  further  stresses  that  the  result  of  their  application  must  in  all  circumstances  qualify as  an 
“appropriate result”.
53 ICC 4462/1985, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 3-29. The dispute arose between the Libyan National Oil 
Company and a US oil Company. The law applicable to the contract was Libyan law. Under US law the contract 
could not be performed by virtue of force majeure. However a close connection of the dispute with US law was 
not established and therefore the arbitral tribunal applied Libyan law which did not establish force majeure.
54 Guiditta Cordero Moss, Tano Aschehoug:“International Commercial Arbitration”, Rome 1999,at page 338. 
55 Article 5 para 2 and Article 6 para 1 of the Rome Convention.
56 J.H.C. Morris: “The Conflict of Laws”, London 2000, at page 347.  
57 Horacio A. Grigera Naòn: “Choice-of-law problems in international commercial arbitration”, Tübingen 1992, 
at page 167. The author suggests that case law in England that in the absence of statutes or treaty provisions 
English Courts may allow the application of such rule
58Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 1 K.B. 614 
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English Channel, France, unlike the UK, has ratified Article 7(1)59 of the Rome Convention. 
This country follows the legalistic approach by allowing foreign mandatory rules to apply 
where they have a close connection with the dispute. 
In some ICC awards foreign mandatory rules will  be considered in the case of an 
embargo as laws of force majeure.60 The performance will become illegal and the aggrieved 
party may plead a force majeure situation, unless mandatory rules are not recognised by the 
arbitral tribunal. This is often the case in some state contracts. But the characterisation of 
some contracts as contracts of “immorality”  on the grounds that  foreign mandatory rules are 
not taken into consideration, requires caution.61 Consequently, a contract should not be void 
due to illegality because of the sole fact that  it  permits a party to conclude a transaction 
abroad which is illegal under local law. 
2.2.2 Mandatory rules of the proper law of the contract (lex causae): 
It has been argued that once a choice of law has crystallised, the dispute is subject to this law, 
including its mandatory rules. In a recent ICC award62 which examined the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty in Competition issues, the arbitral tribunal has applied 
mandatory rules ex officio in the same way as a national judge would do. Generally, respect 
for the mandatory rules of the lex causae is imposed both on the arbitrator and the amiable 
compositeur.63 Swiss  practitioners  however  have  subjected  their  application  to  an 
59The Rome Convention  has  come into  force  in  France  on  the  1st of  April  1991.  N°  loi: 82-523- date  of 
publication on  JO : 03.03.1991. 
60 Stephen V. Berti: “  International Arbitration in Switzerland  ”, Kluwer Law International, London 2000, at 
page 253. Blessing  mentions a ZCC case namely  Krupp v Kopex where the arbitral tribunal had to consider 
carefully international trade sanctions since it might have to declare a contract terminated or extinct due to its 
suspension over a longer period of time and determine the consequences thereof.
61 Generally contracts of “immorality” are subject to annulment. It shall be recalled that the ICC case no 1399/ 
1967 C. of  ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at page 18 concerned this issue. The facts briefly consisted of a contract which 
was concluded between a french and mexican party, subject to foreign law and aiming at escaping customs laws 
of Mexico. Taking into consideration that French law does not take into account customs laws abroad the Judge 
refused to nullify the contract for “illicit cause”. The justification was on the grounds that “there is nothing 
immoral or illicit in not respecting a law which is not of competent application”.
62 ICC 7181/ 1992, C. of  ICC Aw. 1991-1995, at page 55.
63 Jean-Baptiste Racine:“L’Arbitrage Commercial International et l‘ Ordre Public”, Bibl. de Dr. Pr. Tome 309, 
1997, at page 240.
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“application-worthiness” test  (Anwendungswürdigkeit), whether the choice of law was made 
by the parties or the arbitrator, otherwise such rules should be scrutinised “as pertaining to an 
extraneous legal order”.64 The arbitrator should test the legitimacy of the particular norm to 
impose itself on the parties.  Interestingly, the issue emerging is whether the parties intend to 
submit to rules of public policy of the lex causae and whether then the question of nullity of a 
contract arises, recourse should be made to the  lex causae for what is not regulated in the 
contract. Ultimately, the arbitrator should focus on a contract favour validatis without being 
restricted at the same time 65.
 2.2.3 Mandatory rules of the place of arbitration (lex fori): 
Bucher66 commenting on ad hoc arbitration justified the application of mandatory rules of the 
place of arbitration as having “des liens étroits avec le litige”. When the parties intentionally 
purport to derogate from mandatory rules of the lex loci arbitri or the arbitrator for the above 
grounds independently applies a conflict rule, mandatory norms of the private international 
law of the  lex  loci  arbitri shall  in  any case apply.  Remarkably,  in  regard to institutional 
arbitration the arbitral tribunal has to respect the mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act 
prevailing at the place of the arbitration which in turn prevails over institutional provisions67. 
But, the LDIP in the arbitration chapter establishes only one imperative rule. This is Article 
182(3) of the LDIP which refers to the equal treatment of the parties.
64 Op.cit., supra no 59, at page 220. Furthermore he cites the following case: In Re Banco Nacional de Cuba v 
Banco Central de Chile ATF II 348. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court had ruled that in general mandatory rules 
that only aim at protecting a state‘s financial, fiscal or political interests in most cases have not been regarded as 
meeting the “application-worthiness test”, unless there exist very particular ircumstances or connecting factors 
justifying their application. 
65 Jean-Baptiste Racine:“L’Arbitrage Commercial International et l‘ Ordre Public ”, Bibl. de Dr. Pr., Tome 309, 
1997, at page 241.
66 Andreas Bucher: “Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse”, Bâle 1988, at page 81.
67 Article 3(a) of the WIPO Arbitration Rules. 
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In England the position was clarified early in the case of Liverpool Borough Bank v  
Turner.68  Upon  ratifying  the  Rome Convention,  regard  was  shown  to  Article  7(2):  The 
general  principle  is  that  a  UK Statute  does  not  normally  apply  to  a  contract  unless  the 
governing law of the contract is the law of some part of the UK or unless it is an overriding 
statute in the sense that it must be applied irrespective of the rules of conflict of laws. This 
does not automatically render an express choice of law totally invalid for purposes not related 
to the statute. The Court  shall  apply the governing law of the contract as selected by the 
parties69. 
But arbitration has gone down the path to further progress. Additionally, the concept 
of mandatory rules of the  lex loci arbitri is not reconciled with the modern “de-localisation 
theory” which fully supports that the forum may be chosen purely for reasons of neutrality. 
An  arbitrator  should  disregard  a  national  legal  order,  its  substantive  rules  and  principles 
including private international law if it is disconnected  from the dispute to be settled. The 
arbitrator is not a national judge. He does not award justice in the name of a state because he 
lacks lex fori. He is not a guardian of public policy of the host state, although he is substitute 
for the national judge. On the other hand, he should never act as an “obedient servant” of the 
parties.70 
2.2.4 Public Policy of the lex causae: 
There is  no general  public policy exception in the EAA. Assuming the arbitrator  applies 
English conflict of laws rules he may refuse to apply foreign law by virtue of Article 16 of the 
68 2 De G.F. & J 502, at page 507. Lord Campbell had stated that “It is the duty of the courts of justice to try to 
get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. 
In that case the Court shall make a careful examination of the object of the Act and the public importance of  
compliance with it”.
69 Dicey and Morris on “The Conflict of Laws”, Volume 2, London 2000, at page 1221.
70 Stephen V. Berti : “International Arbitration in Switzerland”, Kluwer Law International, London 2000, at page 
220. One ICC case however was criticised by Blessing as a wrong and unconvincing judgment, namely No 
5946/1990, C. of ICC Aw. 1991-1995, at page 97. on the grounds that an arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland 
thought that it should not for reasons of swiss public policy allow a claim for exemplary damages in the amount 
of $100,000.
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Rome Convention. In Swiss law Article 187 does not refer to general dispositions of public 
policy,  distinguishing between dispositions for domestic (Articles  17 and  18)  and foreign 
public  policy  (Article  19  ).  An  arbitrator  is  even  less  obliged  to  give  consideration  to 
economic policy rules of a State whose law was not chosen by the parties.71 
Article 19 has been highly controversial and subject to debate. However it allows the 
arbitrator  to  take  account  of  an  imperative  disposition  of  another  law,  other  than  that 
designated by a rule of conflict or a choice of law by the parties. This occurs where there is a 
close connection with the dispute and legitimate and major interests impose it. The Federal 
Tribunal has ruled that an arbitrator in Switzerland does not have, in case of an express choice 
of law, to apply foreign imperative rules if their non application is not a ground of appeal 
under Article 190 para 2.72 In another case73 the Federal Tribunal asserted that: “The law of a 
country posing an unbearable impediment to invalidate a contract subject  to Swiss law in 
order to protect the financial policy of the state and not the protection of private interests of 
the parties should not be taken into account”. Nonetheless, the same Tribunal in the celebrated 
case of Hilmarton v OTV allowed the application of foreign mandatory rules on the basis that 
they aimed “not only to protect the state but to also reassure a commercial loyalty which is 
also respected by principal European legislative systems”.74 
A crucial question in Swiss practice is: “Does Article 19 apply to international arbitration 
and if yes, what is the relationship between Article 19 and 187?”. Two different views have 
been taken:75
1. Wenger believes that Article 19 has a binding effect on the arbitrator by stating that “the 
arbitral tribunal has to respect the international public policy of such third countries (other 
71 Bul ASA,1992, Vol.1, at page 56.
72 Bul. ASA1995, at page 217, spėc 217, c.2c. Furthermore Article 190 para 2 public policy is not distinguished 
between Swiss and foreign. This article introduces a restrictive list with regard to an appeal on the grounds of 
violation of public policy. 
73 Bul ASA 1988, at page 136, spėc 141-142.  This decision was the beginning of contradictory decisions in 
Switzerland and France.
74 Op.cit., supra no. 69.
75 Daniel Hochstrasser:“  Choice of law and “Foreign” Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration ”, J.I.A., 
Vol 11, March 1994, No 1, at page 61.
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than the one whose law is applicable) who have a close connection to the matter76”. Bucher77 
emphasises  that  although  Article  19 is  not  applicable  to international  arbitration,  a Swiss 
arbitrator as a matter  of important  concept of Swiss legal theory and  discretion may give 
effect to it. 
2.  Lalive  departs  from  the  sui  generis character  of  Article  187 as  lex  specialis for 
arbitration  and pronounced  its  resulting  independence  from the  provisions  containing  the 
conflict rules for contracts ( Articles 112 to 126 ) and the general provisions in Articles 13 to 
Article 19.78
2.2.5 Alternatives:
2.2.5.1 International public policy features both the international public policy of a given state 
and international  public  policy  common to  all  states  interested  in  a  dispute.79 Lalive  has 
triggered a distinction between positive and negative public policy.  Positive public policy 
requires  the application of  strictly  imperative  norms,  namely  lois  de police  as  previously 
examined.  It  is   irrelevant  whether  this  law was chosen by the parties.80 Consequently,  a 
French scholar has viewed international public policy as a less restrictive concept from its 
domestic counterpart81 since it requires conformity only with these legal provisions deemed to 
be absolutely fundamental to the domestic legal order. Negative public policy (ordre public 
d’ éviction) obliges the arbitrator to directly apply an imperative substantive rule. It excludes 
76 Op.cit., supra no. 73. To the words of the practitioner:“ Toward the law declared applicable by the parties or 
the arbitral tribunal, a public policy reservation exists: the arbitral tribunal has to respect fundamental principles 
of law like pacta sunt servanda, “bona fides” and “no expropriation without compensation” which are valid in 
the sense of transnational public policy, independent of the relation of the facts of the case to a special State. 
Article 19 expresses, mutatis mutandis, the deliberations that an international arbitral tribunal has to make when 
it is faced with the mandatory competition law of the EC, with import and export restrictions or with currency 
regulations of a third State ”.
77 Andreas Bucher: “ Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse ”, Bâle 1988, at page 83.
78 Op.cit., supra no. 69.
79 L’Arrêt de la Banque Ottomane de 1984., Révue Critique du Droit International Privé 1985, at page 526. The 
public policies of three states were involved: England, France and Turkey.
80 Frank-Bernd Weigang:“Practitioner’s Handbook on International Arbitration“, at page 1072.
81 Jean Robert:“The French Law of Arbitration”, Matthew Bender Pub. 1983, New York, II: 9-6.
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the application of the otherwise applicable law in cases where such application leads to a 
result repugnant to fundamental notions.82 Strictly speaking, the incorporation of a certain rule 
into  international  public  policy  shall  depend  on  its  acceptance  as  such  by  international 
conventions as a legal principle “common to civilised nations”. 
This criterion was suggested by  Derains to designate the scope of “truly international 
public policy”.83 It is acknowledged that an arbitrator should not agree to be an “accomplice” 
in a deliberate fraud on a mandatory rule that he considers to have the right to be applied. As a 
minimum, he has to guarantee the respect of mandatory rules of the place of the performance 
of  the  contract.  Normally  the  arbitrator  shall  consider  their  application,  on  the  basis  of 
whether the parties have chosen a lex contractus. The will and intentions of the parties shall 
deserve justified appraisal unless they endeavour to evade mandatory rules in violation of 
international public policy. The right method for the arbitrator is to weigh objective interests 
between the different laws, because to him all laws are of equal value. This in conformity 
with  an  objective  test  of  the  foreseeability  of  the  application  of  international  mandatory 
rules.84 Nonetheless a restrictive interpretation of national public policy may be preferable to 
international public policy in the international arbitral justice.
2.2.5.2  Transnational public policy invites the arbitrator, when faced with an argument of the 
possible  illegality of a contract,  not to give effect  to his discretionary appreciation but to 
search  for  “values  largely  accepted  by  the  international  community”.  These  values  are 
traditionally associated with cases of corruption affairs, violation of customs laws, embargoes 
etc. The criterion to apply for the qualification of an imperative norm as part of transnational 
82 These fundamental notions are different from those mentioned in  Articles 17-19 of the  LDIP and must be 
understood to be of a truly transnational nature. 
83 Yves Derains:“Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration”, ICCA New 
York Arbitration Congress 1986, at page 254. On the other hand Jean Robert:“The French Law of Arbitration”, 
Matthew Bender Pub. 1983, New York, II:  9-8 has used the delicate wording:“A point of mediation between 
public and private law”. 
84 Horacio A. Grigera Naòn: “Choice-of-law problems in international commercial arbitration”, Tübingen 1992, 
at page 69. The mere fact that any international mandatory rule or the national legal order to which it belongs has 
some relevant connection with the issue in controversy should render its application foreseeable by the parties. 
Therefore arbitrators should always apply international mandatory rules if, according to the legal orders from 
which they originate, their conditions of application have been met. 
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public policy is to test its legitimacy. In other words, whether it is in line with the needs of 
international commerce and whether it is considered to have a universal validity as such.85 
Nevertheless,  the qualification of a  rule as transnational  does not have to be accepted by 
judicial  systems  in  full.  Transnational  public  policy  is  different  and  independent  from a 
particular state national or international public policy or from a particular state’s public policy 
in international matters. It arises out of fundamental rules recognised by the majority of the 
states and not from a sole state.86 It traces the limit of the agreed tolerance of the states to self 
regulate the merchant society which is however free to regulate its relations and conflicts. A 
state should intervene when the limit of such tolerance is overreached.
2.2.6 Legal order concerning the potential place of enforcement: 
The critical question is: “Should the arbitrator, for concerns of enforceability, render a “wrong 
decision” which however promises to be easily enforceable or should he render a “right” 
decision the enforcement of which might however be less certain?”. The arbitrator’s essential 
duty is to make a correct award which shall not be attacked at the place where enforcement is 
sought. The concern of enforcement is a valid one, but in the overall hierarchy of  “lesser” 
value and may create a “vicious circle”.87 
Even so, enforcement will be likely if the arbitrator is inclined to boost the application of 
mandatory rules of the place where enforcement will be sought. This was anticipated by the 
drafters of institutional arbitration rules who allowed the insertion of express provisions for 
the place of enforcement.88 As stressed by Bucher, by doing so the arbitrator avoids the risk of 
annulment in the place of the seat of arbitration or the recognition of the arbitral award as 
85 ICC 6248/ 1990, C. of ICC Aw. 1991-1995, at page 124.
86 Jean-François Poudret- Sébastien Besson : “Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international”, Bruxelles 2002, at 
page 651.
87 Jean-Baptiste Racine:“L’Arbitrage Commercial International et l‘ Ordre Public ”, Bibl. de Dr. Pr. Tome 309, 
1997, at page 278.
88 Article 35 of the ICC and Article 32.2 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules.
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“exequatur” in the foreign countries whose public policy would be violated. He asserts that 
the arbitrator  must produce an award susceptible  to  “legal  sanction” and “enforcement”.89 
Departing from Article V.1.e.90 of the New York Convention of 1958 it is believed that, since 
the  arbitrator  lacks  the  imperium  of  a  national  judge,  he  should  respect  mandatory  rules 
foreign to the  lex causae  if  he accounts  for  his  award to have the power  of  exequatur91. 
However,  the  sole  fact  that  an  arbitrator  does  not  have  a  lex  fori is  not  a  liberty  but  a 
restriction  because  his  award,  unlike  the  national  judge’s  decision,  must  be  reasoned  to 
acquire a power of exequatur.  
89 Andreas Bucher: “Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse”, Bâle 1988, at page 87.
90 This Article provides that  when an arbitral  award is  refused an  exequatur  in one country it  shall  not  be 
recognised by other signatory countries. However the Geneva Convention in Article IX allows such an ward to 
be recognised by other countries.
91 Jean-Baptiste Racine:“ L’Arbitrage Commercial International et l‘ Ordre Public ”, Bibl. de Dr. Pr. Tome 309, 
1997, at page 273.
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Section III:Possible Choices of Substantive law
3.1 National law: 
By choosing national law to govern their dispute, the parties seem to have opted to safeguard 
their  rights  and  obligations  and  aimed  to  protect  themselves  against  possible  risks  of  a-
national rules. Parties may have more confidence in a national legal system which may also 
be more suitable to a particular contract, have better connections with the parties or be totally 
neutral. Experienced arbitration practitioners do not sympathise with the choice of national 
law as applicable to the substance of the dispute. They concede that national law may be 
outdated  in  a  sense  that  it  does  not  follow  major  changes  in  international  commercial 
transactions and may be fragmentary to the extent that it does not address all relevant issues. 
Nevertheless  the  arbitrator  normally  does  not  sympathise  with  a  choice  of  national  law 
because  he   is  likely  to  avoid  applying  national  mandatory  rules  and secure  the  arbitral 
process from any unexpected and undesired solutions for the parties. 
3.2 State Contracts and Public International Law: 
Public international law is not only applied in disputes between States but also when a State 
and a private party are involved. The internationalisation of state contracts is mainly found in 
the  operated  nationalisations  on behalf  of  the  Libyan  government  and its  concessions  on 
public international law in the course of the years 1973-1974.  In the  Texaco  case the sole 
arbitrator  R.J.  Dupuy  qualified  these  concessions  as  “accords  du  développement  
économique” which form a new category of international contracts governed exclusively by 
public international law.92 
92 Texaco v. Libya (1987) 58 Brit.YB Int'lL 39. 
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To enhance the credibility of such a choice, the principle of effectiveness (as established 
in public international law) demands that the above law be objectively adapted to the realities 
to  which  it  is  addressed,  so  that  it  can  be  recognised  erga  omnes without  disrupting 
expectations or attempting to artificially extend its application to situations that are factually 
out of reach.93 Effectiveness requires  harmony between legal norms, their interpretation and 
the social reality falling within their scope. Public international law should not be passively 
receptive to the factual situations it regulates. Its underlying thrust is to confer on the rule of 
law the maximum possibility of practical enforcement by ensuring that it adequately responds 
to the social realities to which it is addressed.  In this case a fair minded arbitrator is called to 
balance  interests  between  public  international  law  and  private  international  law 
notwithstanding that in the Libyan arbitrations political considerations were at stake.  
 
3.3 Trunc commun-combined laws: 
The starting point of this doctrine is that the parties wish to apply the common part of their 
respective  legislations  to  their  dispute.  The  parties  may  wish  to  exclude  any disposition 
foreign to their respective laws, and this method allows the arbitrator to apply provisions of 
laws which are common to one another.94It applies to both material  and common conflict 
rules.  Trunc Commun was used in the celebrated Channel Tunnel95case where it was agreed 
that “ the construction, validity and performance of the contract shall be governed by and 
interpreted with the principles common to both English and French law”. In default of such 
principles the arbitrator shall be inspired by the legal principles and trade usages.96 In previous 
93 Horacio A. Grigera Naòn: “Choice-of-law problems in international commercial arbitration”, Tübingen 1992, 
at page 106.
94This conduct may also be of assistance in an implied negative choice of law. As previously seen the autonomy 
principle extends to the parties’ tacit choice of law. In arbitral practice, parties’ silence may be interpreted as a 
negative choice of law i.e. not to apply the respective national laws of the parties and not to be subject to any 
national laws.
95 The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France Manche SA. V Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd et al. 10 J.I.A.3, 
59.
96 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, Kluwer Law Publishers, Boston 1990,1st edition, page 275.
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ICC case law trunc commun  was treated as a means of identifying a tacit choice of law or 
filling possible  lacunae in  the absence of choice with regard to the  parties’  interests  and 
expectations.97 Its relationship to the  lex mercatoria  lies in the subsidiary application of the 
latter  when for  some reason  trunc  commun  is  not  applicable.   Trunc  Commun ensures  a 
satisfactory  previsibility.  This  method  is  criticised  as  complicated  and  impractical  on  a 
possible choice of law such as: “Common principles of European laws”. 
3.4 Concurrent Laws: 
Concurrent laws are often applied in international commercial contracts involving states or 
state entities as a party to the contract.  The concurrent laws method allows some balance 
between state law and international law – it recognises the national sovereignty of the state 
party and yet also provides some protection to the private party to the contract. The arbitrator 
shall apply the law of the State and “such rules of international law as may be applicable98.” 
Concurrence of national law with international law indicated by the choice of law clause as a 
subsidiary option was the case in the three different oil concession agreements, namely the 
Texaco, BP and Liamco Arbitrations.99 This was also the case in the ICC 7754/ 1995 award 
where the arbitral tribunal had ruled that even though French domestic law often applied, 
reference by the parties to the CISG would supplement the operation of the national law100.
97 ICC 3540/1980 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 105-115, ICC 2886/1977, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at 
page 332.
98 ICSID Convention, Art 42.
99Kuwait v. AMINOIL 66 ILR, at page 518: “This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance 
with the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international law and, in the absence of such 
common principles,  then  by  and  in  accordance  with  the  general  principle  of  law,  including  such  of  those 
principles as may have been applied by international tribunals.”
100Bull XI/2/ 2000 : ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin JDI, at page 47.
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3. Transnational laws:
3. Denationalisation of applicable substantive law-General Principles of law:
The concept of denationalisation of applicable substantive law and the application of 
general  principles  was  encompassed in  several  cases.  The  Sheikh of  Abu Dhabi101and the 
Aramco102 cases are fairly good examples of the above theory. In Sapphire International103 the 
arbitral tribunal made reference to the rules of good faith and decided that the parties did not 
intend to apply the strict rules of a particular national system but to rely on the “rules of law 
common to civilised nations”. In the 1970s Libyan arbitrations with British Petroleum, the 
arbitrator fell back on the precise wording of the concession. He held it did not provide that 
public international law applied and even if there were no principles common to Libyan and 
international law, the general principles of law would still apply.104  In  DST v Rakoil105 the 
Tribunal  held  the  applicable  law  would  be  “internationally  accepted  principles  of  law 
governing contractual relations”. 
101Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. (1952) 1 ICLQ 247 Invoking Article 17 of the agreement 
between the parties the arbitrator held that it would apply general principles of English law and not municipal 
English law. In his words:“The application of such principles rooted in the good sense and practice and common 
practice of civilised nations”.
102 Saudi Arabia v Aramco (1963) 27 ILR 117
103Sapphire International Petroleum v NIOC Libya, (1973), 53 ILR 297.
104 The  concession  provided that  it  would  be  governed  by principles  of  the  law of  Libya  common to  the 
principles of international law and in the absence of such principles then by general principles of law, including 
those principles applied by international tribunals. The arbitrator noted that this excludes any single municipal 
legal system and rejected BP‘s argument that a legal principle would be applied only if supported by both Libyan 
law and international law or that public international law applied.
105Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v Ras Al-Khaimah National Oil Co [1990] 1 A.C. 
295.  The previous arbitral panel held that it would be inappropriate to apply the law under which any of the 
companies were organised or the law of the State that is party to the agreements. 
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3.5.1.2 Nature of General Principles of law: 
General principles of international law are created through the comparison of national laws 
and  international  resources,  namely  interstate  conventions.  They  seek  to  free  the 
determination of applicable law from the conflict rules of any particular national jurisdiction, 
and locate in it rules that are common to most jurisdictions or embodied in generally accepted 
conventions and international  commerce practice.  The alignment  of national conflict  rules 
with international conventions contributes to the evolution of uniform rules and practices in 
determining  the  applicable  law.  They  are  not  a-national  principles  (which  extract  their 
existence  from non  national  rules)  but  they  are  transnational  conflict  rules  which  apply 
regardless of the nationality of the parties or their residence and are not limited to the territory 
of one or more countries. It does not matter whether they are recognised by all states or in 
other terms. It suffices that they have a universal nature and provide for dominant solutions in 
the  field  of  international  commerce.106 Being  conceived  as  principles  accepted  by  the 
international community they are not a positive law imposed on the arbitrator. In the ICC case 
no  6527/  1991107 the  arbitral  tribunal,  relying  on  the  Hague  Convention  of  1955  on 
International Sales deemed it “more appropriate” to apply general principles of international 
private law as stated in international conventions. In another ICC award, no 1422/ 1986 the 
arbitral tribunal delivered the following award: “ General principles do not derive from the 
usages  and practices of the merchant  community but  from civilised nations,  that  is,  from 
national legal systems”. 
Kahn,  taking  a  more  realistic  approach,  believes  that  these  rules  are  devised  by 
financially  developed  countries  with  a  prospered  economy.108 In  arbitral  practice  their 
106 In the ICC 3380/ 1980, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 96-100, the arbitrator ruled as follows:“General  
Principles prima facie include priciples which arise from international arbitral precedents and one may not  
exclude that  they partly coincide with “trade usages” which the arbitrator must take into account in any event  
take into account in compliance with (the old) ICC Article 13.5.
107 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 185-194.
108 Jean-François Poudret, Sébastien Besson:  “Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international ”, Bruxelles 2002, at 
page 627.
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growing significance derives from their corrective or supplementary effect. Their corrective 
effect lies in their assistance, as a matter of interpretation, in determining whether in essence 
the contract should be governed by national law, unless it is in contradiction with general 
principles. Their supplementary effect allows them to step in insofar as national law is silent. 
In any case it is the responsibility of the arbitrator to deliver a reasoned award.109
Nevertheless, the arbitrator may experience difficulties in applying them. He will have 
to compare a variety of answers provided in different national legal systems and will have to 
reflect on those with the utmost care, when forming his decision (higher standard of authority) 
whereas  in  applying  national  law  he  just  finds  the  relevant  national  provision.  General 
principles  are  not  a  “carte  blanche”  in  the  sense  that  an  arbitrator  should  have an “easy 
ride”.110 
3.5.2.1 Lex Mercatoria:
A French analyst  referring to  lex mercatoria has given a very elaborate definition: 
“The progressive elimination of national law (hindrance to effective commercial relations) 
and the creation of special groups of international traders led to the spontaneous elaboration 
of a network of rules by which to regulate their activities as well as form contracts by which 
to desrcibe and document them111”. This is generally a body of a-national law which affords a 
measure of stability and predictability despite changes in circumstances i.e. force majeure. 
English lawyers have been very sceptical  about  lex mercatoria since little relevant 
case law exists in England. Nowadays it  is welcomed under the “other considerations” of 
Section 46 (1)(b) of the EAA of 1996. In drafting the above section the English legislator was 
not prepared to specifically refer to “rules of law”. Previous case law viewed that a-national 
109 Stephen V. Berti :“Choice of Substantive Law in International Arbitration”, J.I.A. Vol.14, No 2, 1997, at page 
42.
110 Ibid.
111 Jean Robert:“The French Law of Arbitration”, Matthew Bender Pub. New York, para II :4- 19.
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rules  create  ambiguities  and  inconsistencies  and  allow  recourse  to  equity  or  amiable 
composition. Through the passing of time the acceptance of  lex mercatoria  in English law 
was celebrated by the DST 112 case in the late 1980’s where the Court of Appeal ruled that an 
award rendered in Switzerland on the grounds of “internationally accepted principles of law 
governing contract relations” would be enforceable in England.
Lex mercatoria is not incompatible with positive law such as arbitral law. Article 28 
of the Model Law provides that only the parties may authorise the arbitrator to apply  lex 
mercatoria,  otherwise  the  arbitrator  has  to  apply  one  law.  This  proposition  was  also 
strengthened  by the International law Association Resolution in Cairo in 1992 where (even in 
the absence of choice of law) it was stated: “ The fact that an international arbitrator has based 
his award on transnational rules rather than a national law should not itself affect the validity 
and the executive character of the award since the parties have authorised the arbitrator to 
apply such rules”.113 Earlier  the International Law Institute in its  Santiago de Compostela 
session in 1989 expressed the following: “ To the extent that the parties have left such issues 
open, the Tribunal shall supply the necessary rules and principles drawing on the sources 
indicated in Article 4”. 
Although the position is far from clear it is suggested that  lex mercatoria for many 
years  has fallen within the ambit  of amiable  composition. Bucher  has speculated  that  the 
arbitrator in applying lex mercatoria, without being so authorised by the parties, risks being 
judged  for  excess  of  power  and  acting  as  an  amiable  compositeur.114 Nonetheless  the 
arbitrator in an ICC award115 although acting as an amiable compositeur directly applied lex 
mercatoria without express authorisation by the parties.
112Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v Ras Al-Khaimah National Oil Co [1990] 1 A.C. 295
113  http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2000-2.htm, at page 4. 
114  Andreas Bucher:“ Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse”, Bâle 1988,at page 102.
115  ICC 3131/ 1979 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 122-124.
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The ICC and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are innovative in allowing the arbitrator 
to apply a-national rules.116 In any case the parties may have directly117 or indirectly provided 
for lex mercatoria to be applied. The latter method is described as a negative choice of law: 
an implicit choice through contractual analysis.118 From the surrounding circumstances it may 
be proved that the parties did not opt for a national law, thus wishing  lex mercatoria to be 
applied. Regard shall then be made to the real wish of the parties.
In  Switzerland  the  federal  legislator  has  admitted  the  application  of  a-national  or 
transnational rules by allowing the parties to choose lex mercatoria. The arbitral tribunal shall 
apply it  as  the  “rules  of  law” with which the  dispute has  the  closest  connection  (Article 
187(1)). Much controversy has evolved though with regard to the absence of choice:
1. Bucher has adopted a restrictive view in that only the parties can have recourse to 
transnational law and the arbitrator should attempt to establish an “objective link” pointing to 
a national law, since transnational law does not have a territorial dimension.119 He virtually 
suggests that if the parties have not designed any applicable law, the arbitrator should not 
directly invoke  lex mercatoria but primarily focus on applying a “national law”. This is a 
factual situation of a “false conflict” between lex mercatoria and national laws and therefore 
one should not exclusively reason it without illustrating its conformity to national laws.120 In 
the ICC 3131/ 1984121 case the arbitrator reasoned that the application of lex mercatoria does 
not lead to solutions which could not have been achieved through direct application of the 
relevant national legal orders. A functional approach analyst went even further by stating that: 
“Arbitrators must follow a comparative law analysis encompassing a functional evaluation of  
116 Article 17.1 and Article 28.1 respectively.
117 ICC 5314/1988, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 309-314 . The parties have chosen for a specific law with 
reference also to lex mercatoria as supplementary method to fill contractual gaps.
118 Implied negative choice of law: As seen the autonomy principle extends to the parties’ tacit choice of law. In 
arbitral practice parties’ silence may be interpreted as a negative choice of law i.e. not to apply the respective 
national laws of the parties and not to be subject to any national laws.
119 Andreas Bucher:“ Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse”, Bâle 1988, at page 101
120 Horacio A. Grigera Naòn: “Choice-of-law problems in international commercial arbitration”, Tübingen 1992, 
at page 80.
121 This  case  concerned a  contract  of  distributorship  between  a French and a  Turkish party.  The  arbitrator 
indicated  that  lex mercatoria  led to  a  solution  to  be found on the principle  of  “good faith”.  However  this 
principle was common to both French and Turkish law.
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private international laws and national substantive laws concerned with the dispute. Thus lex 
mercatoria becomes positive law”.122 
2. Nonetheless it has been objected that the “closest connection” condition of Article 
187 does not necessarily refer to territorial links.123 From the application of the Federal LDIP 
and  onwards  the  Federal  Tribunal  has  traditionally  ruled  that  an  award  reasoned  on  lex 
mercatoria will  not  be  a  ground  for  its  annulment.  Professor  Lalive  characterised  lex 
mercatoria as “the private international law of the arbitrator”124 Its origin dates back to the 
Roman  pacta  sunt  servanda  principles  that  are  common  to  a  majority  of  national  legal 
systems. In the absence of choice an arbitrator applying lex mercatoria shall not be bound to 
justify his choice by reference to any national conflict rule. An example of this is the ICC 
Palbalk  v  Norsolor125 award  where  the  arbitrator  did  not  make  any reference  to  specific 
legislation and directly applied  lex mercatoria and the  Portland126 case where the Parisian 
Cour de Justice refused to annul the arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitrator had 
directly applied lex mercatoria in the absence of choice by the parties. 
Criticism on  lex  mercatoria 1.  In  view of  its  incomplete  nature lex  mercatoria is  not  a 
comprehensive body of law. As previously examined English practitioners do not sympathise 
with it as they do not consider it a source of English law such as a-national rules.127 It has 
been ironically stated that: “Only these principles that are so general and useless are common 
to the legislations”.128  Notions of lex mercatoria are too vague and very generally conceived 
122Op.cit., supra n.128, at page 84.
123 Jean-François Poudret, Sébastien Besson:“Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international”, Bruxelles 2002, at 
page 641.
124Jean-  François Poudret, Sébastien Besson: “Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international ”, Bruxelles 2002, 
page 642.
125 ICC 3131/1979 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 122-124.The arbitrator faced with a difficulty in applying 
national law and despite the parties’ silence applied  lex mercatoria  in accordance with the principle of good 
faith. 
126 Compania Portland v Primary Coal Inc [1991] 16 Y.Comm.Arb. 142. The Cour de Justice ruled as follows: 
“The arbitrator applied these principle and determined the most characteristic factor connecting the dispute to a 
body of rules of substantive law, taking into consideration the nature of the dispute. He examined the connecting 
factors invoked,  rendered a final  decision that  none of  them justified the application of a national  law and 
decided to apply the body of principles and trade usages called lex mercatoria i..e. international norms that can 
apply to the solution of such a dispute in the absence of a determined [national] jurisdiction”.
127 Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki SA [1983] 3 W.L.R., page 783.
128  Op.cit., supra n. 131.
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and drafted in a sense that it cannot be uniform and remains fragmentated. Fragmentation of 
lex mercatoria implies that lex mercatoria shall regulate the legal relationship of the parties 
within  the  framework  of  applicable  law.129 It  has  also  been  observed  that  arbitrators  are 
covered behind a “prestigious umbrella” of lex mercatoria for not seriously and responsibly 
investigating the applicable rules and justifying their choice. Therefore the question is: “Is lex  
mercatoria a way of facility or even worse the mask of ignorance?”130 
2. Contrat sans loi: The freedom of the parties to choose rules of laws applicable to 
the substance of the dispute may lead them to stipulate that the contract should be interpreted 
according  to  any  rule  of  law.  This  should  not  be  confused  with  lex  mercatoria,  though 
pertaining  to  minimise  or  exclude  the  need  for  supplementary  national  law  or  amiable 
composition. Briefly examined these clauses lead to a contract with no governing law known 
with a French term as  contrat sans loi and aim to remove the contract from any control of 
superior  norm. The French position is  that  one should not condemn the function of such 
contracts.  Fouchard believes that these contracts appear to admit the application of general 
principles.131 They may fall within the scope of Article 1496 of the NCPC in a sense that these 
clauses do not prevent the arbitrator from submitting the contract to the rules of law offered 
by the above article.
3.5.2.2 Self regulation of lex mercatoria: 
Arbitration is  probably the sole autonomous legal  regime to boast  about  evolution of  lex 
mercatoria through years of countless decisions. The latter self regulated coherent normative 
body  is  suitable  for  international  trade  and  is  referred  in  international  conventions  on 
129 Infra.
130 Guiditta Cordero Moss, Tano Aschehoug:“International Commercial Arbitration”, Rome 1999, at page 272, 
However favourising lex mercatoria the author contends that arbitrators using this method are “social engineers“ 
in the sense that the are highly qualified and experienced in tracing principles and values of the international 
business community.
131 Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman “Traitė de l‘ arbitrage commercial international”, Kluwer Law International, 
Paris 1996, at page 816.
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arbitration.  The  persuasive  force  of  arbitral  precedents  on  lex  mercatoria has  rendered  a 
substantive review of arbitral awards by national courts non existent.132 Self regulation of lex 
mercatoria was  the  outcome  of  the  attempt  by  some  arbitrators  to  detach  international 
commercial  transactions from rigid national laws. To achieve this goal the arbitrator used 
flexible and rational techniques and comparative methods. It is also hoped by the parties that 
he will avoid such rules that are unfit to govern an international contract and affect the quality 
of the award. 
3.5.3 Trade Usages-Codified Terms: 
Typical clauses are the INCOTERMS of the ICC which give guidance to the interpretation of 
the contract. The codification of such usages by a professional organisation does not modify 
their nature but rather aims to define the obligations of the parties when incorporated into a 
contract. They are habitual conducts and practices generally followed by a field of commerce 
and do not have an obligatory force133 as customs. They are not a source of law and have no 
force of norms unless a specific law refers to them. Their mission consists of filling gaps that 
a law may have created but they should not be considered as equal instruments with other 
sources of law. The Geneva Convention Article VII para 1 and the UNCITRAL Model Law 
Article 28 para 4 both stipulate that in any case, whether it concerns an ordinary arbitration in 
law  or  an  amiable  composition,  the  arbitrator  shall  take  into  account  the  contractual 
stipulations  and  trade  usages.  The  Vienna  and  Hague  Conventions  along  with  previous 
arbitral awards on international trade may serve as a  dues ex machine for the arbitrator to 
make a predictable choice in default.134
3.5.4 UNIDROIT Principles: 
132 ICC 4131/ 1982 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 146-153.
133 The presumption of submission by the parties to such usages operates in favour of their obligatory nature as 
Article 9 para 2 of the Vienna Convention provides. 
134Jean-François Poudret, Sébastien Besson : “Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international”, Bruxelles 2002, at 
page 628.
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They were agreed in Rome in 1994. Their aim was to establish a “neutral set of rules that may 
be used throughout the world without any particular bias to one system of law as opposed to 
the other”.135 In the preamble it is stated that they shall apply in the case where the parties 
have so stipulated i.e. for UNIDROIT principles to apply, the parties should have agreed to 
apply  general  principles  of  law  otherwise  they  are  not  applicable.   Remarkably  these 
principles are principles related to the interpretation of contracts as stated in Article 1.6 (1), 
according  to  the  principle  of  “good  faith”  which  is  illustrated  in  Article  1.7(2).  The 
UNIDROIT  Principles  aim  to  ensure  fairness  in  international  commercial  relations  by 
expressly stating in Article 1.7 that the general duty of the parties is to act in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing136 and in a number of instances, imposing standards of reasonable 
behaviour. Bad faith is not defined by the restrictive or extensive character of interpretation. 
Only the conflict of will of the parties existing at the time of conclusion of the contract, and 
the interpretation expressed at the time of the dispute, are an expression of bad faith. The 
technique of  these  principles  is  not  limited  to an  exhaustive  list  but  allows to free  these 
principles from principles of comparative law. 
3.5.5 Ex aequo et bono:
For  reasons  of  simplicity  the  English  legislator  avoided  the  use  of  the  Latin  and 
French expressions “ex aequo et bono” and “amiable compositeur” in the EAA deeming that 
the such concepts did not historically develop in English law and English arbitral practice.
In international commercial contracts, it is quite common that the parties may opt for 
their dispute to be decided not under a recognised system of law but under what is often 
135 Redfern/  Hunter:“Law and Practice  of  International  Commercial  Arbitration”,  3rd edition,  London Sweet 
&Maxwell, 1999, at para 2-66.
136 These standards of fairness shall be taken into account only to the extent that they are shown to be generally 
accepted among the various legal systems. This is so explained by the fact that standards of business practice 
may indeed vary considerably from one trade sector to another.
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referred as “equity clauses”.  Equity clauses are not positively viewed by English scholars 
since they exclude recourse against violation in point of law. English law until 1996 had no 
flexibility  with  regard  to  an  arbitration  clause  with  a  provision  for  equity  or  amiable 
composition.  Nowadays  the  parties’  contractual  choice  plays  a  significant  role  and  the 
arbitrator shall not apply equity unless so authorised by the parties.137 Nonetheless the new 
EAA implicitly allows for the application of equity by virtue of Section 46(1)(b) of the EAA 
which  empowers  the  arbitrator  to  decide on any basis  at  all,  including  his  own personal 
impression of what is “fair” in the circumstances. 
Thus, the critical question is whether the arbitrator, deciding on equity, may derogate 
from contractual stipulations. The exact nature of the powers of the arbitrator deciding on 
equity  was  ambiguous.  The position  of  English  law was  illustrated  in  the  Mentor case138 
where an “honourable engagement” clause did not entitle the arbitrator to decide on his own 
notion of what is fair.139 In a previous case, namely Orion Compania Espanola140 the Court 
was of the opinion that such a clause should be invalid because the arbitrator should decide 
according  to  ordinary  rules  of  law,  otherwise  his  award  could  be  set  aside.  However,  a 
deviation from the standard stance of English law regarding equity was permitted in the Eagle 
Star case.141 Lord Denning stated  that:  “  It  is  the  clause which  is  common in treaties  of 
reinsurance providing that  the arbitrators  are  not bound by the strict  rules  of law but are 
enjoined to decide according to an equitable rather than a strictly legal interpretation of the 
provisions of the agreement”. 
Swiss law departs from the concept that the arbitrator is tied to the contract.142 The 
provision  of   Article  31  para  3 of  the  previous  Concordat of  1969  was  retained  in  its 
137 This is so inferred by ( Section 5(1)) of the EAA.
138 Home and Overseas Insurance Co Ltd v Mentor Insurance Ltd [1990] 1 W.L.R.153.
139 The clause as the learned judge stated did no more than give the arbitrators the liberty to depart from the 
ordinary or literal meaning of the words used in the clause.
140 Orion Compania  Espanola  de Seguros v  Belfort  Maatschappij  voor  Algemene  Verzekgringeen  [1962] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 257. 
141 Eagle Star Insurance Co. V Yuval Insurance Co Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357, at page 361.
142 Bul ASA 1990, page 179.
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successor  LDIP in  Article 187(2).  The latter  provision allows the parties  to  authorise the 
arbitral  tribunal  to decide the case  ex aequo et  bono but  they must  do so unequivocally, 
otherwise  para (1) applies and the case shall be decided according to “rules of law”.  It has 
been conceded that  the principle “pacta sunt servanda” should not lead to an inequitable 
result since Swiss law allows for judicial adaptation of the contract in some cases.143 Article 5 
of  the ZCC distinguishes between  ex aequo et  bono  arbitration  and arbitration  in equity. 
Equity is distinguished from amiable composition in that it is a broader concept and applies a 
solution based on the case in point without taking account of general  pre-existing norms, 
whereas amiable composition allows the arbitrator to moderate the effects of the application 
of law only by referring to that law.144  The expression ex aequo et bono is better attached to 
arbitration in equity rather than amiable composition. However, Swiss law is more relaxed 
and treats these notions equally. This distinction seems purely artificial since the arbitrator in 
both cases may use his own sense of justice and fairness. 
 To continue, in some cases these two expressions may be synonymous. According to 
Article 28(3), the parties may authorise the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute ex aequo et  
bono or as amiables compositeurs. Amiable composition is currently not known or used in all 
legal systems and there exists no uniform understanding as regards the precise scope of the 
power of the arbitral tribunal.145 When parties anticipate an uncertainty in this respect, they 
may seek a clarification in the arbitration agreement by a more specific authorization to the 
arbitral  tribunal.  Paragraph (4) is  more restrictive than the analogous provision of  Article 
143 Ibid.n. 151.
144 Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman “Traitė de l‘ arbitrage commercial international”, Paris 1996, at page 848.
145Before the enactment of the EAA of 1996 the particularity of English law with regard to amiable composition 
was explained through case law. In the Czarnikow Ltd v Roth Schmidt & Co case  [1922] 2 KB 478, it was stated 
at page 491 that: “ The amiable compositeur and the arbitrator-non judge in general are not to be trusted. As long 
as the Courts of this country have a statutory supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrators in England, it must remain 
a firm principle of the law governing arbitrations that that which is, in English law, a question of law shall 
remain in all aspects and for all purposes a question of law”. Otherwise the decision risks to be objected on the 
grounds of public policy. b) David Taylor& Son v Barnett Trading Co case [1953] 1 Lloyd‘s 181, at page 187 
Lord Denning ruled: “ There is not one law for the arbitrator and another for the Court. There is one law for all”.  
c)  Orion  Compania Espanola  de  Seguros  v  Belfort  Maatschappij  voor  Algemene  Verzekgringeen [1962]  2 
Lloyd‘s Rep 257, at page 266 : “ By virtue of English public policy the arbitrator must apply a defined and 
recognised legal system”.
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1497 of the French NCPC and makes clear that in all cases, i.e including an arbitration ex 
aequo et bono, the arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract 
and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.  To avoid 
terminological confusions the arbitrator is advised to have recourse to the will of the parties 
(volontė réele).
In any case, the amiable compositeur remains bound to apply contractual provisions 146 
and may disregard a party’s legal or contractual rights only when the enforcement of such 
rights  amounts  to  an  abuse  thereof.  In  several  cases,  La Cour  de  Paris defined  amiable 
composition in a  negative way: “The clause of amiable composition is the giving up of the 
contractual  provisions  to the effects  and benefit  of  the rules  of law.  The parties  lose the 
prerogative to demand the strict application of contractual provisions and the arbitrator gets 
correlatively the power to modify or moderate these provisions to the extent that equity and 
common interests of the parties demand it”.147 
146This position was espoused by the ICC 3938/ 1984 case C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 501-507. The 
arbitrator ruled as follows: “According to the dominant doctrine and the practice of international commercial 
arbitration, the amiable compositeur remains tied to the contract”. 
147 Jean-François Poudret, Sébastien Besson: “Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international”, Bruxelles 2002,at 
page 653.
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Section IV: Absence of choice: 
4. CONFLICT RULES
4.1.1 Objective approach: Applying the closest connection test:
In response to the problem of an absence of choice of law, English law has set forth the 
basic criterion of the objective test148 of  closest  and most real  connection.149 A subjective 
theory comprising a general question of “was proper law intended by the parties” prevailed 
for a specific period of time. In conjunction, the new test at common law has introduced more 
objective parameters for ascertaining a choice of proper law when the intention of the parties 
with regard to the law applicable to the contract was not expressed and could not be inferred 
from the circumstances. This shall comprise considerations of the place of contracting, place 
of performance150, place of residence or business and the nature151 and subject-matter of the 
contract which constitute strong presumptions.152
Previous common law offered a broad flexibility through a range of presumptions. As 
already mentioned in Section 1,  Article  3  (1) presupposes  that  the choice  must  be either 
"express''  or  "demonstrated with reasonable certainty''  by the terms of the contract  or the 
circumstances of the case. If either of these requirements are not fulfilled, then resort is made 
to the provisions of Article 4 (1), i.e. the law of the country with which the contact is most 
closely connected.The presumption of Article 4((2) is of limited effect and does not apply 
when the characteristic  performance cannot be found. Still,  none of these presumptions is 
148 Dicey and Morris on “The Conflict of Laws”, Volume 2, London 2000, at page 1215. 
149 Amin Rasheed Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co, [1984] AC 50.  To define the system of law a contract has its 
closest  and  most  real  connection,  the  only  factual  circumstances  which  could  be  taken  into  account  were 
contemporary surrounding circumstances  and events  subsequent  to  the  conclusion  of  the  contract  were  not 
relevant.
150 The Assunzione [1954] P.150. The decisive factor was that both parties had to perform in one country, namely 
Italy.
151 Re United Railways of the Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd [1960] Ch 52, page 91.
152 Compagnie  Tunisienne  de  Navigation  SA  v  Compagnie  d’Armement  Maritime  SA  [1971]  AC  572  and 
Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd v James Miller and Partners Ltd [1970] AC 583.
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conclusive.  For,  according  to  Article  4  (5),  the  presumptions  are  to  be  disregarded,  if  it 
appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with 
another country (one resorts back to  Article 4 (1)). The Guiliano-Lagarde Report153 extracts 
some examples from the Swiss practice154which has traditionally followed the test of closest-
most characteristic performance, namely that the contractual relationship shall be governed by 
the law applicable to at the place of business or habitual residence of that particular party 
which has to perform the characteristic performance. 
4. Conflict  Rules  of  the  place  of  arbitration:  Applying  an  entire  conflict 
system-“Legalistic Approach ”:
The Institute of International law in its Amsterdam session of 1957 declared that: “The rules 
of choice in force in the State of the Seat of the arbitral tribunal must be followed to settle the 
law applicable to the substance of the difference155. Furthermore relevant provisions are found 
in the Geneva Convention156and the ZCC Rules.157 While the judge has to apply the private 
international law of the forum, so does the arbitrator. In support of this view, the arbitrator in 
two ICC awards, namely Nos 1598/ 1971158 and 1455/ 1967,159 for the sake of convenience 
and predictability, ruled that: “the law in force at the seat of arbitration must be followed”. 
This single conflict factor, which is easy to identify, is also selected by the arbitrators, when 
153 Dicey and Morris on “The Conflict of Laws”, Volume 2,  London 2000, at page 1216. The Guiliano-Lagarde 
Report has discussed that in order to determine the country with which the contract is most closely connected it 
is  also  possible  to  take  into  account  factors  which  supervened  after  the  conclusion  of  the  contract.  The 
presumptions of  Article  4 of  the R.C.  are  only “rebuttable”  and the Court  has a  “margin of  discretion”  in 
disregarding  them.  No  further  guidance  is  given  as  to  what  material  will  be  sufficient  to  rebut  these 
presumptions. This rebuttable presumption is also found in Article 117 III of the LDIP.
154Ibid,  at  page  1237.  Unilateral  contracts  do  not  create  any  implications.  Payment  of  money  is  not  the 
characteristic performance but it is the performance for which the payment is due which is characteristic of the 
contract.
155 Article 11. 
156 Article VII allows not only the parties but also the arbitrator to design the applicable law by recoursing to the 
conflict rule he deems appropriate.
157 Article 4 of the ZCC Rules of Arbitration:“ The choice of law rules found in the LDIP apply unless the choice 
of law rules of the domicile or habitual residence of each party coincide”. 
158 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at page 19.
159 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at page 215.
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the  private  international  law  systems  connected  with  the  dispute  do  not  provide  clear 
solutions, or lead to contradictory solutions160.
In England, the position of common law before the enactment of the EAA was that in the 
absence  of  choice,  the  law  applicable  to  the  dispute  would  be  inferred  by  the  seat  of 
arbitration. The arbitrator, even in the case where the arbitration rules were silent, was bound 
by the private international law choice of law rules of the place of arbitration.161 This method 
is in line with the localisation theory which furnishes the arbitrator with the duty of the legal 
characterisation of the dispute and the allocation of governing law on the basis of the principle 
“qui  elegit  judicem  elegit  ius”.  In  Compagnie  d’  Armement162,  a  contractual  clause  for 
arbitration to take place in London at first instance was not a choice of English law but a 
strong indication.  This  strong indication  in  favour  of  the  lex  loci  arbitri  doctrine  (indice 
sérieux) was enunciated in several English cases.163 Generally, an English arbitrator is likely 
to apply the conflict rules of the seat of arbitration. But Section 46(3) has paved the way of 
de-localisation  and has  freed  the  English  arbitrator  from any restriction to  apply  English 
private international law and particularly the Rome Convention provisions. 
In institutional arbitration it is believed that when it comes down to a contract between 
the arbitrants and an arbitral institution, the law of the seat of the institution should be the 
governing law.164 Nevertheless, this presumption is rebutted for obvious reasons in the case of 
ad hoc arbitration. The home law of an arbitrator may be relatively difficult to apply since an 
160 ICC 2637/ 1977, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at page 13. This case concerned a dispute between a French 
seller and a Spanish buyer. France ( like Switzerland, the seat of the arbitral court ) had ratified the Convention 
on Conflict of Laws (1995) concerning international sales which provides for the application of the law of the 
seller’  s  country.  Spain  had  not  ratified  the  above  Convention.  The  arbitral  Tribunal  considering  the 
disadvantages of applying the private international law of the country where arbitration takes place found it 
correct  to resort  to  it  in  view of  the discrepancies  between the laws of  the parties’  respective  countries  of 
residence.
161Czarnikow Ltd v Roth Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 K.B. 478. 
162 Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v Compagnie d‘Armement Maritime SA [1971] AC 572,
163 The SLS Everest[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 389, The Mariannina [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 12. Egon Oldendorff[1996] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 380.
164 Patrick Scheldstoerm:“The Arbitrator‘s Mandate”, Stockholm 1998, at page 430.
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ordinary  ad hoc  arbitration is held by a panel of three arbitrators who may be of different 
national backgrounds. This raises the question: “Whose law shall apply?” 
By strictly applying the lex loci arbitri, the arbitrator seems to derive his power from 
national law and not the arbitration agreement. This is a  territorial sovereign concept since 
the lex fori purports to replace the parties’ agreement. Lack of the appropriate certainty which 
other conflict of laws rules and rules of the lex causae offer,165 and foreseeability of the result 
of this method lead to its abandonment by contemporaneous international arbitration practice 
in favour of the de-localisation principle.
4.1.3 Another method: Cumulative application of relevant conflict rules: 
This  method,  developed  in  the  U.S.  conflict  of  laws  system,  concerns  the  cumulative 
application of conflict rules of the legal systems interested in the dispute. Its objective is to 
ascertain whether the relevant conflict rules connected to the dispute all point166 to the same 
substantive law. At the same time, he is not charged with determining which among these 
systems  shall  apply.  If  they indeed  point  to  one  law the  arbitrator  has  to  specify  which 
particular conflict rule he deems applicable.167 This method is also availed in “false conflict” 
situations. Factors to be taken into account consist of a set of standards from the conflict rules 
of the parties’ residence, seat of arbitration and those where the contract is to be performed. 
Alternatively, the arbitrator shall also have recourse to previous arbitral practice.
This method is better suited to the parties’ expectations and does not treat them as 
rigidly as the arbitral seat theory. The arbitrator’s goal is to connect the choice of law with the 
contractual  agreement.  However,  it  has  been  argued  that  conflict  of  rules  may  point  to 
165 Jean-François Poudret, Sébastien Besson:“Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international”, Bruxelles 2002, at 
page 607.
166 Mauro Rubino Sammartano:“International Arbitration Law”, 1st edition, Kluwer Law Pub., Boston, 1990, at 
page 264. The author states the ICC 5118/ 1986, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at page 318, where both Tunisian 
and Italian law pointed to the application of the law of the place of the formation of the contract which lead to 
the application of Tunisian law.
167 ICC 6283/ 1989, C. of ICC Aw. 1991-1995, at page 178.
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different substantive laws. To avoid such inconsistencies the arbitrator shall interpret some 
rules in a flexible way, in order to reconcile all the rules and avoid making a choice as to 
which system of private international law is applicable.168
4.1.4 General principles of private international law: 
A criterion to test whether a principle is generally recognised is to presume that it should be 
identified  within  the  ambit  of  international  conventions.  However,  if  a  state  has  not  yet 
ratified the respective Convention and is not willing to be bound in future, then the above 
presumption shall not apply.169 Examples of such general principles are the Rome and Hague 
Conventions. Generally this method is based on a “comparative approach” and is of great 
assistance170 where private international law rules of the national systems connected with the 
dispute do not coincide171. An example is to determine the law closely connected with the 
dispute.
4. Determination by the arbitrator:
4.2.1 Delocalisation: 
This principle lies in the entire detachment of international commercial arbitration from any 
control by the law of the place in which it is held. However arbitration will probably still be 
subject  to  possible  provisions  of  the  law  of  the  place  of  enforcement.  International 
168 ICC 5314/1988, C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at pages 309-314.
169 Giuditta  Cordero,  Moss-Tano  Aschehoug:  “International  Commercial  Arbitration-Party  Autonomy  and 
Mandatory Rules”, Rome 1999, at page 257. The author states an Italian case ( Dec. 08.02.1982, No 722, Rivista 
del Diritto Internazionale e Processuale,  1982, 829 ff.) where the Italian Supreme Court refused to enforce an 
English award without being reasoned, though valid under English law, on the basis that the Geneva Convention 
was applicable even if not ratified by the UK as the expression of general principles required the awards to be 
reasoned. 
170Kuwait  v.  AMINOIL,  66 ILR  518,  21 ILM  976.  In this  case  the  Court  was not  engaged  with  issues  of 
internationalisation of state contracts and applied private international law and especially general principles of 
private international law.  
171 Ana  M.  López  Rodríguez:“Lex  Mercatoria  and  Harmonization  of  Contract  Law  in  the  EU”,  DJØF 
Publishing, 2003, at page 77.
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commercial arbitration is sufficiently regulated by its own rules which are either adopted by 
the parties or drawn up by the arbitral tribunal itself.172 
Bucher has  emphasised  that  the  autonomy  of  the  private  international  law  of 
arbitration implies  that  the arbitrator  does not have a  lex fori from which he can borrow 
conflict  of  laws  rules  so  as  to  be  bound by them as  the  national  judge.173 He  is  not  an 
instrument  of  a  state’s  judicial  process  in  the  same  way  as  national  courts  are.  In 
contemporary arbitral practice the private international law suitable to arbitration should be 
positively expressed as the prolongation/ extension of the autonomy and will of the parties to 
the autonomy of  the  arbitrator.  This  is  described as  the  “taking of  the  principle  of  party 
autonomy  to  its  extreme”.174 The  autonomy  of  the  arbitrator  shall  also  depend  on  its 
recognition  by  the  national  legal  systems  and  is  always  subject  to  public  policy 
considerations. This is in compliance with the concept that delocalisation is subject to the lex 
loci  arbitri.  In  pursuance  of  this  view Professor  Lalive has  commented as  follows:  “The 
arbitrator  exercises  a  private  mission,  conferred  contractually  and  it  is  only  by  a  rather 
artificial  interpretation  that  one  can  say  that  his  powers  arise  from-and  even  then  very 
indirectly- a tolerance of the State of the place of arbitration, or rather of the various states 
involved which accept the institution of arbitration, or of the community of nations, notably 
those which have ratified international treaties in the matter”.175
4.2.2 English rule: 
The application of a conflict rule is reflected by Article VII para 1 of the Geneva Convention 
of 1961,  Article 28 para 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and  Section 46(3) of the EAA. 
Article VII para 1 of the Geneva Convention, which the UK has not yet signed, was viewed as 
172 Redfern/  Hunter:“Law and Practice  of  International  Commercial  Arbitration”,  3rd edition,  London Sweet 
&Maxwell, 1999, at para 2-19.
173 Andreas Bucher:“ Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse”, Bâle 1988, at page 79. 
174 Jean Robert:“The French Law of Arbitration”, Matthew Bender Pub., New York, II:4-12.
175 Okezie:“Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration“, CT-USA 1994, at page 124.
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extremely innovative at the time of its entry into force, as it conferred on the arbitrator even a 
limited discretion to indicate a conflict  rule which in turn leads to the designation of the 
governing law. These laws preferred to retain the reference to a conflict rule in order not to 
diminish the predictability of the outcome of the use of “rules of law”. With regard to English 
law an arbitrator is allowed to choose a “law” or a “rule of conflict”. As seen under a previous 
heading, Section 46(3) opened the path for the arbitrator to apply foreign conflict of law rules, 
notwithstanding that, in practice, he is challenged to apply English conflict of laws rules.176 In 
the first place, the English legislator, contrary to the Swiss one, did not intend to award the 
arbitrator powers to decide the applicable law according to a “rule of law” in Section 46 (3). 
This was viewed as a concept foreign to the English legal tradition. Until recently, “rules of 
law” were criticised for possible ambivalent outcomes, in the sense that their extensive use 
would  contradict  the  parties’  contractual  expectations  and favour  the  application  of  such 
“rules” without the parties’ consent.177 
4.2.3 Swiss Rule-Contractual analysis method: 
In Switzerland, in the absence of choice, the arbitrator shall decide the case according to rules 
of law with which the dispute has the  closest connection (  Article 187(1)). This method is 
regarded as a particular voie directe differing from the voie directe of French law and the ICC 
Rules  in  that  the  LDIP  specifies  the  rules  of  law with which  the dispute  has  the closest 
connection.178 The above article does not give explicit directives to the arbitrator but provides 
an element of the liens les plus étroits. The criterion gives effect to the principle of proximity, 
centre  of  gravity  and  closest  connection  from  which  inspired  the  drafters  of  the  Rome 
176 English law, unlike the Swiss LDIP ( Article 190 ) allows an appeal in Section 69 where an erroneous choice 
of law has been made by the arbitrator even in the case he applies English conflict of laws rules. 
177 Jean-François Poudret- Sébastien Besson : « Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international », Bruxelles 2002, 
at page 612.
178 The closest connection should be established on a case by case basis, not following the contract-type formula 
of Article 117.
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Convention (Article 4 para 1) and bears some resemblance to the common law concept of 
“proper  law  of  the  contract”.  This  method  concerns  a  conflict  of  rule  for  international 
arbitration and not an ordinary application of private international law of the forum.179 It is 
also apparent from the “closest connection rule” otherwise known as “centre of gravity” or 
“most significant relationship” wording of Article 4(2)180 and (5) of the Rome Convention and 
Article 187 of the LDIP  that the arbitrator shall not be confined to apply a specific conflict of 
law system or a conflict of law rule. On the other hand, he shall not have a “carte blanche” to 
apply any kind of law he fancies.181 The term rules of law makes it clear that the arbitral 
tribunal  shall  not be bound to determine the applicability of one specific law but has the 
freedom to base its award on “rules of law” (including a-national or transnational rules of 
law).
 The above approach was termed by  Blessing as “substantive law autonomy”.182 In 
contrast with the analogous rigid Section 46(3) of the EAA, Article 187(1) is an innovation of 
Swiss law. It acknowledges the arbitral tribunal’s same degree of autonomy as the parties, in 
that  it  can declare  “rules  of  law” and not  just  “a law” applicable.  Practically,  Article187 
should rarely give rise to serious discussion in Swiss arbitration. 
The progressive  tendency in Switzerland is  that  the arbitrator  shall  primarily  give 
precedence to the application of the contract underlying the dispute and sometimes proceed to 
interpret  it.183 Therefore,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  contractual  provisions  prevail  over  an 
applicable  (national)  law (which  in  many cases  is  not  familiar  to  the  parties).  Rarely do 
arbitrators strive to investigate appropriate conflict rules. They normally examine the parties’ 
contractual  provisions  and  whether  they  are  consistent  with  the  principle  of  the  parties’ 
179Article 187(1)   departs from that principle by supporting an independent conflict of laws rule making, chapters 
1 to 11 of the LDIP are inapplicable either directly or per analogiam. 
180 A recent English case on the issue was Bank of Baroda v Vysya Bank [1994] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 87.
181 Infra no 174.
182Stephen V. Berti : «  International Arbitration in Switzerland“, Kluwer Law International, London 2000, at 
page 189. 
183 Ibid. no 174.
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autonomy, for the contract is in the final analysis an embodiment of the parties’ expectations 
on how their transaction should be executed. 
At this point, the ICC 1990/ 1977184 case is noteworthy. The arbitrator, to the extent 
that the provisions of the contract are sufficiently detailed to enable resolution of the dispute 
at hand, and do not infringe the provisions of mandatory rules, usually applies them without 
having to determine the applicable law. But the application of contractual provisions is not a 
substitute in all cases to making a positive choice of law.  In certain cases, the arbitrator shall 
exercise  his  discretion  to  select  a  governing  law.  Nonetheless,  following  the  contractual 
method, a careful weighing, guided by international standards and taking into account fair and 
reasonable expectations of the parties, seems very promising and reliable. 
4.3 French Rule: 
A direct choice method (voie directe) is encompassed in Article 1496(1) of the French NCPC 
of 1981, Article 1054 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure of 1986 and Article 17.1 of the 
ICC and  Article 22.3 of the LCIA institutional Rules. France has enacted the most liberal 
arbitral system by entirely freeing the arbitrator from any particular conflict of rules method. 
Article  1496 para 1 of  the NCPC does not  confine the arbitrator  within  sharp limits  and 
therefore allows him to decide the dispute in accordance with “rules of law” and not just “a 
law” by choosing directly the “rules of law” he “considers appropriate”. Virtually nothing 
obstructs him from applying a choice of law rule or using any other method of selecting the 
applicable law as he sees fit.185 The distinction between “the law” and “rules of law” mainly 
184 C. of ICC Aw. 1974-1985, at page 217.
185 Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman “Traitė de l‘ arbitrage commercial international“, Paris 1996, at page 870. The 
author notes making a comparison with Swiss law that although Article 187 of the LDIP is said to be restrictive 
on the powers of the arbitrator and in practice it is flexible. He invokes an ICC case, namely no 7154/ 1994, C. 
of ICC Aw. 1991-1995, at page 555, where it was held that the contract in dispute had closer connections with 
the law «which preserves» its existence than with the law which denies it. Therefore the arbitrator is not deterred 
from measuring on a case by case basis the strength of the links between the various laws and the case being 
heard.
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lies in the fact that when the arbitrator chooses “the law” he has to designate one particular 
national law, as being the law applicable to the contractual relationship. Other sources of law 
or supra-national principles also qualify as rules of law.
French law envisaged any reference to a conflict rule as useless because the arbitrator is 
not restricted to rule according to a national law. The whole process added a needless and 
complicated step in the process of reaching a determination.186 The concept  is  that  in the 
absence of a choice by the parties the arbitrator is given the same power and freedom as the 
parties to consider a wide variety of sources when determining the applicable law. 
To elaborate on the process, the voie directe leads, as in the choice of law method, to a 
law which is based on the connections between the case and the chosen law. However the 
arbitrator is free to choose the law more suited to the disputed contract by considering how 
the contract is drafted or the concepts to which it refers. Though not obliged to provide a 
reasoning,  the arbitrator  shall  have to go through a  consistent  thinking process.  Berger187 
reasonably holds that even by using a voie directe the arbitrator shall have to justify his choice 
by stating sources and means which led to that choice. Practically the voie directe does not 
differ much from the closest connection criterion of Article 187 of the LDIP since it requires 
justifications. His decision should correspond to the “objective” expectations of the parties by 
measuring policies of globalisation and harmonisation of laws in the commercial, financial, 
banking and competition fields.
4.4 Alternative method: Functional analysis: 
186 Jean Robert:“The French Law of Arbitration”, Matthew Bender Pub., New York, II:4-17.
187 Jean-François Poudret- Sébastien Besson : «Droit Comparé de l’ arbitrage international», Bruxelles 2002, at 
page 622.
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In  the  landmark  ICC  case  1422/  1966188 the  arbitrator  followed  a  two  step  process.  He 
invoked  private  international  law  conventions  and  with  a  certain  “discretion”  applied  a 
conflict  of  laws  method  by  balancing  contractual  terms  with  national  legal  systems’ 
considerations.  This  is  a feature  of a “multi-aspect  method” which is  also described as a 
“functional analysis”. Outside the field of arbitration, the same method is known as a “false 
conflict” technique and followed by the national judge. Normally, the process consists of: a) 
the  leaving  aside  of  considerations  of  irrelevant  private  international  law systems,  b)  the 
absence of incompatible solutions among the relevant ones and c) the functional comparison 
among the solutions currently offered by the latter and those by the private international law 
system the arbitrator chooses.189 Thus, the arbitrator shall compare the private international 
laws connected with the dispute and the policies of the substantive laws designated by them. 
In reality, this reflects a tendency to look behind the legal formalities and penetrates legal 
structures and institutions in order to attain the best solution in terms of fairness-justice.  The 
operation of the functional analysis190 is associated with a prima facie rebuttable presumption 
that the law chosen by the parties is to apply, unless the  mandatory  norms indicated by the 
connected conflict of laws systems should be applied to debate their underlying policies. 
188 In this case, there was a contract between a Swiss company and an Italian company under which the former 
undertook to distribute in the US and Mexico products manufactured by the latter. The arbitral tribunal was 
called upon deciding on the applicable law, as the parties have not designated it. By considering a grouping of 
connecting factors instead of an independent conflict of laws rule, the arbitrator applied Italian law which did not 
run contrary to the “general principles common to all civilised nations”. Both French law (lex loci arbitri) and 
Swiss law (law of domicile of the one party) concurred in designating Italian law as lex fori. 
189Giuditta  Cordero  Moss-Tano  Aschehoug:  “International  Commercial  Arbitration-Party  Autonomy  and 
Mandatory Rules”, Rome 1999, at page 252. 
190 Horacio  A.  Grigera  Naòn:  “Choice-of-law problems  in  international  commercial  arbitration”,  Tübingen 
1992, at page 65. The author describes it as a “mixed approach”.
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Conclusion
This essay examined an overview of the legal framework of a choice of law. Issues of 
choice of law arise not only in the absence of choice but also in an express and implied choice 
of law. The arbitrator is entrusted to trigger a preliminary evaluation of all three situations and 
cast  a  decision  as  to  what  law  or  rules  of  law  he  shall  apply.  The  particularity  of  this 
autonomous regime is that, unlike a national judge, the arbitrator is not bound to deliver an 
award according to a national law. This is also supported by the change in delivering awards 
on the grounds of a-national rules. Lex mercatoria is nowadays invoked by the arbitrator not 
only when faced with an absence of choice of law but also in an express choice of law. Being 
a  sensitive  tool  in  the hands of  the arbitrator,  the  above trend seems to be a  convenient 
solution for the arbitrator, notwithstanding that ruling on lex mercatoria requires an extensive 
reasoning and provides a ground of appeal in point of law at the forum where enforcement is 
sought. However in most cases he shall have regard to arbitral precedents and use his own 
experience in commercial disputes. 
National arbitral legislations throughout developed countries in Western Europe have 
increasingly  encompassed  new  trends  in  this  field  of  private  international  law,  and 
institutional rules have achieved their primary goals. However issues of applicable law are 
still at stake. In later decades, distinguished practitioners have led arbitrations whose very 
nature  was problematic  from scratch because  the  parties  failed  to specifically  refer  to  an 
applicable law or their lawyers negotiators were irresponsible in procuring the parties with 
professional advice. Furthermore complicated business transactions gave rise to concerns of 
the law applicable to the substance of the dispute and ended up being resolved before an 
arbitral  panel  rather  than  before  a  national  judge.  It  was  felt  that  an  arbitrator  is  more 
trustworthy in providing tailored solutions to the problem. His awards, reflecting the reality in 
business, may be more delicate and produce a better law than an award rendered by a national 
judge.
50
Undoubtedly conferring justice should be independent  of commercial  expectations. 
But this paper endeavoured to assess current arbitral strategies and radical business practice. 
Commencing the analysis from the less relaxed English system and passing through the Swiss 
one which is more liberal, a generous attempt was made to bolster the French system, the only 
one to take the first legislative step to ensure the greatest liberty and integrity on the arbitrator 
to choose the applicable law. To go beyond common experience, even the French system does 
not deserve full support since the arbitrator shall practically still follow a conflict method. To 
be realistic, arbitrators nowadays follow a contractual approach. This entails an appropriate 
and  responsible  interpretation  of  the  contract  through  an  intimate  look  at  current  market 
practices.  This  is  an  empirical  approach  which  leaves  aside  considerations  of  conflict 
methods. In due course,  the contractual analysis  shall  assist  the arbitrator in sketching an 
overview of the legal framework of the question at hand. 
 I shall now turn back to public policy and mandatory rules considerations.  Knoepfler 
has for years stood against any detachment of arbitration from public policy. He has strongly 
argued that parties who have chosen arbitration should not be treated differently from those 
who have not by using the following wording191: “The parties do not leave the world entirely”. 
He probably took such a stance to anticipate that in the final analysis they have to return to a 
national court for enforcement issues. Additionally, lack of a common approach even within 
decisions rendered by expert arbitrators of the ICC makes a consensus on public policy even 
more difficult. This paper endeavoured to generate a primary discussion of how the contract 
between the parties is to be affected by any kind of mandatory rules or public policy. Due 
considerations were given to the parties expectations and how an invoked mandatory rule 
would disadvantage any of them. At this point, an arbitrator should be attentive in penetrating 
into the core of the dispute. He should also predict and discern any existing or subsequent 
191 Daniel Hochstrasser:“ Choice of law and “Foreign” Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration ”, J.I.A., 
Vol 11, March 1994, No 1, at page 61.
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conduct of the losing party to invoke a mandatory rule in order to be discharged from his 
contractual obligations. 
Consequently, the arbitrator shall take account of conceptions of each national legal 
order and define which rules and principles are to be considered mandatory and elective when 
dealing with an international transaction. It will be his task to evaluate, in the light of other 
policies, the degree to which the public policy underlying general conflict rules of concerned 
fora should prevail when the decision of the specific issue in dispute is at stake.  Therefore, 
although enforcement is normally unpredictable, the arbitrator is at least able to identify the 
national legal systems showing contacts with the dispute.
Assuming the arbitrator is a fair minded lawyer and businessman, he will observe any 
technicalities and formalities and procure an award which will not be contested in the forum 
of enforcement.  Generally, to reconcile this wide freedom of the arbitrator in choosing a law 
or  a-national  rules  with  national  interests  disguised  under  the  mask of  public  policy and 
mandatory rules and the parties’ right in challenging the award, the place of enforcement 
seems practically to be the only limitation. Before delivering an award, he shall abstain from 
contradicting any mandatory rules or public policy practically at the place where enforcement 
is sought. A functional analysis enhances rationality, comprehensibility and possibilities of 
the enforcement of the award.
Fundamentally  arbitration  is  constantly  undermined.  Although the  idea  of  pushing 
arbitration  forward  has  gained  ground  over  the  years,  national  legislators  are  not  really 
enthusiastic about it. Being the matrix of professional litigation, arbitration has pioneered new 
trends in every field of commercial  law. Entrenched by old fashioned and outdated ideas 
national judges rarely admit the supremacy of this regime.  
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